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Abstract 
The purpose of this note is to compare the characteristics of the actual Stability and 
Growth Pact with that of a European “modified golden rule”. The latter would consist in 
achieving in each EU country a cyclically-adjusted net-of-public-investment balance. The 
benchmark for comparison is the classification adopted by Kopits and Symansky (1998) on 
“ideal fiscal rules”. This classification has been used by Buti et al. (2003) in order to 
demonstrate the “ideal character” of the actual Stability and Growth Pact and thus legitimate 
only slight modifications to the Pact. I intend to show rather, that the “modified golden rule” 
is a better fiscal rule than the actual Pact. 
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Introduction 
 
It is widely recognised that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has lost most if not all of 
its capacity to refrain European governments from implementing over-expansionary policies, 
notably pro-cyclical policies when economic growth is over its potential. In this context, 
modifying the way fiscal policies are being implemented in Europe still keeps on being a very 
important issue1.  
Three main kinds of reform to the current SGP have been considered so far2. First, 
considering that governments are mature enough to reach fiscal discipline, they should not 
have to resort to rules, commitments and so forth. Their track-records would testify for this 
evidence. However, basing upon history and political economy arguments, most economists 
still disregard this option. If such a reform has been promoted by some (the argument is 
present in Kopits, 2001), it is still not “fashionable”. The second way for a reform would 
introduce slight modifications to the actual Pact. Buti et al. (2003) and the European 
Commission (2002) stand as the most zealous promoters of what I would call a “low-fat 
reform”. A third proposal has been made in favour of the application of a “golden rule of 
public finance” to the European Union (EU). Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) have recently 
endorsed this reform. The proposal by the Italian Minister of Finance, M. Giulio Tremonti, to 
implement a European-wide public investment program in order to boost growth, while at the 
same time removing the incurred expenditures from the deficit target of the SGP is a recent 
concrete example of what a “golden rule” would be at the European level. Some countries 
have also recently experienced this fiscal setting (the UK, see Emmerson and Frayne, 2001; 
and Australia, see Robinson, 2002). 
The purpose of the note is to compare the characteristics of the actual SGP with that of a 
European “modified golden rule”. The benchmark will be the classification adopted by Kopits 
and Symansky (1998) regarding “ideal fiscal rules”. This classification has been used by Buti 
et al. (2003) in order to demonstrate the “ideal character” of the actual SGP. I intend to show 
rather, that the “golden rule” is a better fiscal rule than the actual SGP. 
                                                 
1 The nominal convergence period before the advent of the Euro had already produced major discussions 
between the pros (Bovenberg and de Jong, 1997; Bovenberg et al., 1991; Wyplosz, 1991) and cons (Buiter et al., 
1993) of debt and deficit ceilings. 
2 Buti et al. (2003) present a synthetic table of the exhaustive reforms which have been proposed since 
2000. Institutional reforms, like those proposed by Wyplosz (2002) – the seminal paper and proposal can be 
found in von Hagen and Harden (1994) – or Pisani-Ferry (2002) are beyond the scope of this note. 
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The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 briefly presents the current situation of 
public finances in the Euro area. The gap between the “proximate goal” of the SGP and 
outcomes appears to be wide. The classification of an “ideal fiscal rule” is presented and the 
marks attributed to the SGP by Buti et al. (2003) are discussed. Section 2 focuses on the 
recent proposals by Buti et al. (2003) and the EC for improving the Pact. A critical view is 
adopted. Finally, pros and cons of adopting a “golden rule” in the EU are discussed in section 
3. Using the Kopits and Symansky (1998)’s classification, this rule appears superior to the 
actual SGP. Numerical application and simulation support the conclusion that adopting a 
modified version of the “golden rule of public finance” would not harm long-term 
sustainability. 
The Stability and Growth Pact  
In contrast to the central monetary policy implemented by the European Central Bank 
(ECB), fiscal policies in the euro area are still in the hands of national governments. In order 
to remove the supposedly negative cross-border effects of a domestic fiscal policy over its 
partners, be they European countries or the ECB, the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties have 
introduced limits to public debts and deficits3.  
The current situation 
Though much was written to demonstrate that deficit ceilings would not be breached, so 
that automatic stabilisers would be fully effective4, the years 2002 and 2003 have witnessed at 
least three countries (Portugal, Germany, France) whose public deficits have been or will be 
above 3% of GDP (table 1). France will be the first country in the euro area history to 
acknowledge a public deficit above the limit for two consecutive years. Preliminary 
government forecasts (last column) in 2003 are expected to be largely outpaced in Germany 
and Portugal. 
This situation is at odds with the goals of the SGP, namely ensuring fiscal prudence and 
discipline. It is thus reasonable to consider that the SGP is actually flawed and that EU 
citizens deserve a better Pact. The question remains on which Pact should be adopted. 
 
                                                 
3 Beetsma (2001) reviews arguments in favour of the SGP. 
4 Three contributions can be found in Brunila et al. (2001). 
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Table 1. Net borrowing (-), general government, as a percentage of GDP 
 2001 2002 2003 2003(2)
Germany -2.8 -3.6 -3.4 -2.8 
France -1.5 -3.1(1) -3.7 -3.4 
Italy -2.6 -2.3 -2.3 na 
Portugal -4.2 -2.7 -3.5 -2.4 
Euro area -1.6 -2.2 -2.5 na 
Source: EC Spring forecasts 2003. 
(1): including a capital endowment to Réseau Ferré de France. 
(2): government’s forecast or commitment at the beginning of 2003. 
 
An “ideal rule”? 
Though the adoption of a fiscal rule has almost seemed unquestionable so far, identifying 
the desirable features of a “good rule” is a necessity. According to Kopits and Symansky 
(1998, pp.18-19), 8 properties should be achieved for a fiscal rule to be labelled “ideal”: the 
rule should be well-defined, transparent, simple, flexible, adequate, enforceable, consistent 
and efficient. 
Or, quoting Kopits and Symansky (1998):  
1. “a fiscal rule should be well-defined as to the indicator to be constrained, the 
institutional coverage, and specific escape clauses, in order to avoid ambiguities 
and ineffective enforcement”; 
2. “an essential characteristic of a durable fiscal rule is transparency in government 
operations, including accounting, forecasting, and institutional arrangements” in 
order to gain “popular support”; 
3. “rules should be characterized by simplicity to enhance their appeal to the 
legislature and to the public”; 
4. “rules must be flexible to accommodate exogenous shocks beyond the control of 
the authorities”; 
5. “fiscal rules should be adequate with respect to the specified proximate goal”; 
6. “a fiscal rule should be enforceable. (There is) a need for constitutional or legal 
statutes, possibly accompanied by penalties for non-compliance and authority for 
enforcement”; 
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7. “a closely related criterion is for a set of fiscal rules to be consistent internally, as 
well as with other macroeconomic policies or policy rules”; 
8.  “most rules cannot last for long unless they are supported by efficient policy 
actions. (…) From this perspective, (…) a fiscal rule may be viewed as a catalyst 
for fiscal reforms that would be necessary anyway to ensure sustainability”. 
These 8 properties cover a mix of political and economic concepts. Properties 1, 2, 3 and 
6 are more political than they are economic, whereas the reverse is true for properties 4, 5, 7 
and 8. Keep in mind however that, though some of these properties are political, they have 
gained a large success in the monetary policymaking debate due to their supposedly inherent 
tendency to enhance credibility5.  
Hence, the different features of an “ideal” fiscal rule in the sense defined by Kopits and 
Symansky (1998) pertain to all aspects of transparency by central bankers in the sense defined 
by Geraats’ (2002, p.F540). Geraats distinguishes 4 transparency features: political, 
economic, procedural and operational. “Political transparency” (“openness about policy 
objectives and institutional arrangements that clarify the motives (of the policy)”6) is dealt 
with in properties 1 (defining the institutional background), 3, and 5 (defining the motives) of 
Kopits and Symansky’s classification. The “economic transparency” (in terms of “economic 
information”) is explicit in properties 2 (transparency) and 7 (internal and overall 
consistency). “Procedural transparency” (describing the way “policy decisions are taken”) can 
be linked to property 2, but so does “policy transparency” (which embeds explanations of 
present and future policies), though the latter is also present in property 8 (efficiency). 
“Operational transparency” (including the discussion of “errors for the operating instrument 
and macroeconomic transmission disturbances”) is present in properties 4 (flexibility) and 6 
(enforcement). Characteristics for an “ideal” fiscal rule are thus near to “ideally transparent” 
monetary policymaking.  
Due to the possible trade-off between transparency and credibility however, it remains 
doubtful that the 8 properties for an “ideal fiscal rule” would enhance the credibility of fiscal 
policymaking. 
                                                 
5 Despite mixed theoretical results supporting the view that transparency in monetary policymaking should 
enhance credibility (Cukierman, 2001), Blinder (2000) found support by policymakers and central bankers that 
improving transparency and openness is favourable to credibility.  
6 Quotes in this paragraph are taken from Geraats (2002). 
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It is of course acknowledged by Kopits and Symansky (1998) that the 8 features might 
not be fulfilled at the same time by any set of fiscal rules all over the world; some “trade-offs” 
among them are likely, indeed “inevitable”. This is not to say that a fiscal rule should not aim 
at all of these properties, or that all trade-offs produce the same overall efficiency; inevitably, 
some are more inefficient than others. In the present situation, some economists argue that 
between the goals of transparency and flexibility, the former should be favoured (Buti et al., 
2003); the same allow preference towards enforcement rather than simplicity etc. Others may 
rather distort these properties in favour of flexibility and at the expense of simplicity. The 
“golden rule” might be resulting in such a modification of this specific trade-off. Finally, 
there is also a political trade-off between these 8 different features: the political cost of losing 
“popular support” if the rule is not considered sufficiently transparent can be counterbalanced 
by the political gain of adopting a simple rule –such can be the case with the current SGP. 
Hence, choosing among the alternative trade-offs remains a political choice. 
Before turning to the subjective values attributed to these properties, for different sets of 
rule, I discuss their distinct virtues. Some features, like 1 (well-defined) and 6 (enforceable) 
are rather unambiguous and unquestionable.  
Transparency might be slightly more cumbersome: transparency can come at the expense 
of discretion and the latter might, under peculiar circumstances7, help to stabilize the 
economic after a shock has occurred.  
The adequacy feature deeply depends on the final goal of fiscal policy: be it “fiscal 
discipline” or “inflation-output trade-off”, the adequacy feature might be valued very 
differently!  
The efficiency feature falls under the same type of criticism as adequacy: Kopits and 
Symansky relate this feature to the sustainability of public finance, though the latter could be 
replaced, for instance, by the minimisation of the variance of the domestic output.  
The adequacy and efficiency features do in fact mix short-run and long-run issues: fiscal 
policy is constrained in the short run (adequacy to the “proximate goal” of fiscal discipline, as 
it is the case in the EU) to achieve a long-term target (sustainability). Nevertheless, achieving 
public finance sustainability does not need to impair short-run fiscal policies: an expansionary 
                                                 
7 Notably in the case of economic agents having rational expectations, since only unexpected policies 
should have real effects.  
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fiscal policy in the short-run may be reversed in the mid-run8, or in the long-run if the 
economic situation which gave rise to an expansionary policy (mass unemployment; deep 
recession, etc.) still prevails in the mid-run. The sustainability of public finance might also be 
achieved through an appropriate change in the price level, along the so-called “fiscal theory of 
the price level” (Woodford, 2001). In this latter case however, fiscal policy would impair 
price stability at a low level, and the consistency between fiscal and monetary policies thus 
needs a clear assessment.  
The consistency feature is obviously an important one in the EU. First, since at least the 
adoption of the Maastricht treaty, budgetary recommendations have put fiscal policy under 
pressure in order not to jeopardise the prevalent goal of the ECB, price stability, partly the 
main reason why deficits and debts ceilings were maintained after the advent of the Euro. 
Second, even if the hierarchy of goals in the EU (price stability comes first; economic growth 
is second at best) were being reversed, consistency between a modified fiscal rule and other 
policies would still have to be ensured, so that consistency would still remain a key feature of 
an “ideal rule”. Any conflict regarding the final policy objectives which could arise between 
monetary and fiscal authorities would still be likely to produce large costs to the society, via 
high interest rates, high inflation rates or high public deficits (as the outcome of a “chicken 
game” between both types of authorities).  
Considering that enhancing “appeal to the public” necessitates simplicity can be viewed 
as quite disrespectful towards the public; adopting a “complex rule” should not be made 
impossible insofar as authorities face incentives to endeavour to express “complex rules” in a 
simple manner. Moreover, some may think that simplicity vis-à-vis the public has more to do 
with a symbolic figure (say, 3 per cent) than with the economic concept with which it is 
related. Good communication, in my view, should necessitate both, hence also a clear 
understanding of what the underlying target incorporates. The public would thus be able to 
fully appropriate the rule at stake. Accordingly, the SGP is the simplest rule, since it is related 
to a symbolic figure as well as to the most easily understandable public finance concept – the 
overall public deficit. 
The flexibility feature is a key economic mechanism in order to counter an expected or 
unexpected shock, as the economic situation in Europe during 2002 and 2003 has testified for: 
a substantial part of public deficit increases has been due to the automatic stabilisers which act 
                                                 
8 A situation which is already incorporated in the SGP, where the mention to the “close to balance or in 
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as a social safety net, for instance through unemployment benefits. Whatever the underlying 
model, there is wide agreement among economists on the capacity of fiscal policy to smooth 
fluctuations in the business cycles at least in the short run (Blanchard, 1997, for instance).  
Basing upon the properties defined by Kopits and Symansky (1998), Buti et al. (2003) 
have assessed the performance of the SGP (table 2). The values or marks attributed to the 
different features are quite high and justify only slight modifications to the Pact. According to 
Buti et al. (2003), the two most important drawbacks of the SGP (under its original form) are 
that it is not enforceable (as the situation in 2003 seems to confirm) and generally not 
underpinned by tax and spending reforms9.  
According to me, and as regards the actual economic and budgetary situation in the euro 
area, these two properties would rather deserve a worse appraisal (table 3). As far as the 
opportunity of implementing tax reforms is concerned, the SGP has shown that it lacks an 
incentive to prevent governments from not benefiting from upswings to increase public 
surplus or implement a fiscal reform. Hence, governments have not used margins for 
manoeuvre at the time they had tax pots to reduce substantially their deficits and, 
consequently, they have had to implement once-and-for-all, pro-cyclical, policies to curb 
deficits when the cycle had changed trend. This can be illustrated by the German case in 
2003, where the Schröder government has decided to increase social contributions though the 
German economy is more or less in a trough10.  
It seems also quite obvious that the Pact is not enforceable at all, at least until the 
plausibility of the imposition of sanctions has not been increased. Though this argument is 
endorsed by Buti et al. (2003), I value it very differently. Evidence shows that a country 
facing a proposition of early-warning mechanism by the European Commission does not face 
reputational costs under the form, say, of higher long-term interest rates. The adoption by 
Ecofin council of an early-warning procedure to France has had no impact, at least until mid-
2003, on long term interest rates nor on the willingness of the French government to reduce 
deficit at a faster pace.  
Concerning the so-called “well-defined” property, Buti et al. (2003) point to some 
ambiguities, notably as regards the imprecise definition of a medium-term target of “close to 
                                                                                                                                                        
surplus” refers to the medium term. 
9 Kopits and Symansky (1998) pledge for a long-lasting fiscal rule thanks to fiscal reforms rather than to 
one-shot measures (whose effects may not prove permanent). 
10 The Schröder government has also decided to reduce the income tax rates ever since. 
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balance or in surplus”. I lessen the value because of the vagueness of the institutional 
coverage of the early-warning mechanism or of the proposition for recommendation by the 
European Commission (EC). It is quite embarrassing that propositions by the EC are 
publicized, though they might not be endorsed by Ecofin for good economic reasons. As 
Fitoussi and Creel (2002) argue, the leniency by the Ecofin may look like a “political climb-
down from previously-agreed budget precepts. Ecofin is quickly accused of undermining the 
credibility of the SGP” (p.58), though leniency may be economically meaningful: agreeing 
that Germany suffered from a downturn which could explain, at least partly, the huge growth 
in the deficit between 2001 and 2002 made sense, economically and empirically. 
Transparency also deserves a lower mark. To me, this is due to the absence of a clear 
institutional setting between the EC and the governments. Two arguments may be involved. 
First, “the respective roles of Commission and national forecasts in the assessment of Stability 
and Convergence Programmes remain undefined” (Buti et al, 2003). Second, and more 
important to me, the initiative of action by the EC, as regards recommendations or the early-
warning mechanism, is often left at its own discretion. For instance, the SGP gives power to 
the EC for identifying any “significant divergence” of the medium term domestic budget 
balance from the target. However, the SGP failed to define what “significant divergence” 
means exactly so that the EC has had to give and impose its own interpretation. In EC (2002), 
it is stated that: “To ensure consistency across Member States, the Commission took three 
factors on board as follows: the size of the budgetary slippage (…); the reason for the 
budgetary slippage (…); the risk of an excessive deficit position (…).” (p.36). The 
institutional arrangement which has led the EC to have to interpret the SGP is flawed, at least 
not fully transparent to say the less. 
. 
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Table 2. The SGP rule against ideal rules standards 
Ideal fiscal rule  SGP actual rule 
(according to Buti et al., 2003) 
1. Well-defined ++ 
2. Transparent ++ 
3. Simple +++ 
4. Flexible ++ 
5. Adequate relative to goal ++ 
6. Enforceable + 
7. Consistent ++ 
8. Efficient + 
Legend: +++ very good, ++ good, + fair 
Source: Buti et al., 2003. 
 
Table 3. The SGP rule against ideal rules standards – “my way” 
Ideal fiscal rule  SGP actual rule 
1. Well-defined + 
2. Transparent + 
3. Simple +++ 
4. Flexible + 
5. Adequate relative to goal + 
6. Enforceable – 
7. Consistent – 
8. Efficient – 
Legend: +++ very good, ++ good, + fair, – bad 
 
The flexibility property is obviously difficult to satisfy in the case of a rule which is 
intrinsically always a bit rigid, in comparison with a discretionary policy. Nevertheless the EC 
has argued that the existence of escape clauses (an annual GDP reduction of at least 0.75%) 
and the possibility of accumulating a deficit until it has reached 3% of the GDP let sufficient 
margins for automatic stabilisers to be fully effective. While the argument seems 
straightforward in accounting terms, it is inconsistent with the initial conditions in the EU 
where public finances have never been maintained “close to balance”11, though this appears as 
                                                 
11 Basing upon EC forecasts (November 2002), the Euro area public finances were balanced in 2000, but 
were preceded and followed by a deficit of respectively 1.3 and 1.5 percent of GDP. 
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a necessary condition for grasping sufficient margins for manoeuvre12. Moreover, the SGP 
does not take into account an economic slowdown in the escape clauses, though a slowdown 
(like a GDP decrease) may have substantial consequences on the deficit13. 
The adequacy of the SGP relative to final goal depends, of course, on the goal itself, but 
even in the case where the goal of “fiscal discipline” remains unquestioned, the SGP has 
failed. Big countries have not complied with their Stability Programmes and they have 
breached the deficit ceilings. Thus, there is something wrong with the procedures and the 
mechanisms at work. Obviously, targeting another goal like economic growth, or coordination 
of economic policies, the track-record of the SGP would appear worse than ever. Limitations 
of public deficits in no way urge economic growth, as they limit the scope for demand 
management (in the case of an unfavourable demand shock, whose size would be superior to 
0.75%− ) or for fiscal reforms (in the case of an unfavourable supply shock)14. The SGP does 
not either tackle the issue of coordination which is left to informal meetings of the Eurogroup 
and to the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines which are meant to limit the scope for 
“discretionary coordination” (see Korkman, 2001). Setting a “fair” value to the adequacy 
property is the best I can do. 
Last, the consistency feature of fiscal rules in the euro area should have its value 
mitigated by taking into account the interactions between fiscal and monetary policies. The 
architecture of the SGP has been originally meant to protect the ECB from lax fiscal policies 
which would have jeopardised the achievement of its objective of price stability. 
Nevertheless, the actual situation has been such that most public deficits have mainly been 
driven by contra-cyclical adjustment whose inflationary consequences are thus very 
unlikely15. Despite this empirical fact, the ECB seems to be relinquishing, at least is reluctant, 
to reduce substantially its interest rates. Either, it seems as if the ECB Governing Council did 
not want to help governments to curb their deficits. Or it shows that the ECB is still 
suspicious on governments trying to make it endorse a more expansionary monetary policy 
than what would be optimal in order to compensate for their own expansionary policies, 
                                                 
12 See Dalsgaard and de Serres (1999). Their results suggest that, for the majority of countries, if 
governments were to aim for a “close-to-balance” budget rule, defined as a cyclically-adjusted deficit between 
zero and 1 per cent of GDP, the actual deficit would, with a 90 per cent likelihood, remain within the 3 per cent 
limit over a five-to-seven-year horizon without the need to adjust fiscal policy in a pro-cyclical fashion. 
13 This point is made clear in Coricelli and Ercolani (2002). 
14 In a recent contribution on the Keynesian vs. non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, van Aarle and 
Garretsen (2003) show that non-linearities between fiscal adjustment and private spending, hence non-Keynesian 
effects, are rare. 
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though the latter are more “automatic” than they are discretionary. Moreover, the EU policy 
mix16 is not enforced; consequently, it is not efficient in enhancing “consistency”. In fine, the 
relevance of this type of policy mix ought to be questioned. Leaving more discretion to the 
implementation of fiscal policies in a monetary union whose federal budget is very weak does 
make sense as regards, for instance, the Optimum Currency Area literature (Kenen, 1969). 
Accordingly, I value “consistency” of the actual SGP badly.  
A “low-fat reform” for the Stability and Growth Pact 
As a consequence of their mild assessment of the SGP, Buti et al. (2003) have elaborated 
some reform proposals for the Pact. They focus on the following properties of an “ideal fiscal 
rule”: transparency, efficiency, flexibility, and enforceability. 
In order to improve transparency as well as to enhance efficiency, the authors propose 
that one-off measures be publicized and be excluded from the domestic structural balance 
targets insofar as they are really temporary. This part of the reform would reduce 
governments’ incentives to contract public deficits on a temporary basis in order not to breach 
the deficit ceiling, as the latter would be assessed exclusive of these “one-off measures”; 
meanwhile, they could be implemented in order to cope with a deterioration in economic 
growth. More flexibility would thus be gained. But it necessitates an “agreed definition of 
one-off measures (which) should complement the existing agreement on how to compute 
cyclically-adjusted balances” (p.25). Unfortunately, Buti et al. give no information on the 
methodology to be used in order to define these “one-off measures”.  
Moreover, as regards the “efficiency property”, it is not sure that less “one-off measures” 
will lead governments to implement tax reforms. The expected positive effects of these 
reforms are, at best, long to come, whereas their negative impact on public finances comes 
first17, so that governments might still face substantial difficulties limiting their deficits and in 
the meantime implementing tax reforms.  
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Portugal is the exception with its deficit in 2001 having been largely driven by high structural 
expenditures. The inflationary consequences for the euro area are however very marginal. 
16 Following the Maastricht treaty, the EU policy mix can be described by the adoption of constraints to 
domestic fiscal policies while monetary policy is given much leeway to determine precisely its target (a change 
in the CPI index below 2% in the medium term) and to implement its policy. 
17 A reduction in tax rates generally decreases tax receipts in the short run. “Reaganomics” are a good 
example. 
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Improving flexibility is also at the core of Buti et al.’s proposals. Hence, they favour the 
adoption of cyclically-adjusted targets for the deficits (a measure which is under way since 
2001, see EC, 2001), but with a special feature: the fiscal rule would be diversified, i.e. 
countries with higher debt and/or larger automatic stabilisers would target a lower cyclically-
adjusted deficit, while other countries would benefit from higher deficit targets. This special 
feature is somewhat inconsistent with the adoption of structural targets, for which one would 
rather have automatic stabilisers play fully with no distinction as regards public debt; no 
doubt that it shows that Buti et al. (2003) still emphasize the 3%-of-GDP target for the overall 
public deficit. Adopting a uniform cyclically-adjusted deficit limit in the EU would create 
very different overall public deficits, with indebted countries being likely to breach the 3%-
of-GDP limit as their interest payments are substantial. Buti et al. reject this situation in 
advance. 
They promote “rainy-day-funds” so that tax pot episodes are not used for electoral 
matters but, rather, are saved for worse (“rainy”) days. It would actually imply a constructive 
major change in the SGP: the Pact would be symmetric with a maximum allowed worsening 
of cyclically-adjusted balance agreed upon by European governments. This point however 
raises a very specific issue related to democracy. At the question: what governments ought to 
do with extra-receipts, democratic governments could generally answer by either buying back 
some public debt, or lowering the deficit, or engaging in a discretionary policy. With the 
reform envisaged by Buti et al., governments could only reduce their deficit… What would 
they therefore be elected for? 
Buti et al.’s last proposal may be viewed as even less “democratic” than the previous one, 
as they propose that the EC implements the fiscal rules, while the European Council would 
decide on the corrective measures to be implemented by the defaulting country. To make 
enforcement easier, Buti et al. further suggest that EC recommendations become proposals, 
which would necessitate that unanimity, rather than qualified majority, be reached to reject it. 
While their proposition would certainly enhance enforcement, it would increase the EU 
democratic deficit. This may impede transparency as more power in the hands of the 
Commission may reduce its accountability. The EU has yet one authority whose 
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accountability is almost non-existent (at least, is not incorporated in any treaty)18; so does it 
deserve another one? 
Adopting a Golden Rule 
Confronted with the inability of the actual SGP to manage transparency, flexibility, 
enforceability, consistency, efficiency and so on, there have been proposals for the adoption 
of a “golden rule of public finance” in the EU (most recent contributions are Fitoussi and 
Creel, 2002; Le Cacheux, 2002; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). Such a rule states that, over 
the cycle, government borrowing should not exceed net government capital formation; hence, 
current expenditures should be financed by current receipts. The question remains on how to 
evaluate the depreciation rate of public capital formation in order to compute net capital 
formation data, maybe one reason why Germany’s legislation still hinges on gross fixed 
capital formation19. 
The rationale and some answers to criticism 
Theoretical rationale for excluding public capital expenditures from the public deficit’s 
target is linked to the necessity of spreading the costs of public capital formation over the 
years during which they will be used20. Empirical rationale for doing this can be linked to the 
bias against public investment which is a consequence of the actual SGP: as documented in 
Balassone and Franco (2000)21, there has been a close relationship between fiscal 
consolidation and cuts in capital spending in Europe during the eighties and nineties. This 
relationship is still prominent after the adoption of the Euro: Portugal has reduced public 
                                                 
18 The Maastricht treaty defines the statutes of the European System of Central Banks. Accountability of 
the ECB reduces to an annual report and a meeting for its President at the European Parliament where the latter 
has no executive power and cannot give an impulse to a change in the ECB’s statutes, unlike the US Congress 
towards the Fed. As for the Commission, it is (at least) collectively accountable vis-à-vis the European 
Parliament. 
19 The “net” vs. “gross” capital formation debate is beyond the scope of this note. In fact, this issue could 
be incorporated in the transparency component of an “ideal fiscal rule”. The debate at stake is mostly one of 
terminology: if  a “golden rule” were implemented in the EU, be it in terms of “net” or “gross” capital formation, 
politicians and policymakers should make it the most transparent as possible, so that no confusion arises. 
20 Though the welfare benefits of boosting public investment may be unevenly distributed across 
generations – public investment should increase private capital formation and wages, but the latter rise only 
gradually whereas the former is in the hands of the “elderly” –, Heijdra and Meijdam (2002) show that financing 
some part of public investment with public bonds enhances equality across generations. A “golden rule” is thus 
theoretically welfare-improving. 
21 See also EC (2003) and notably, table III.3 which shows that fiscal consolidation induced by high debt 
levels and the need to satisfy the Maastricht criteria coincided with relatively larger cuts in public investment. 
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investment substantially after its public deficit has breached the Pact’s ceiling in 2001. 
Adopting a “golden rule” would put an end to this negative bias. 
Two additional advantages with this rule should be noted. First, as European countries 
aim at “creating the most innovative area in the world” (Lisbon summit recommendation), 
there should be budgetary scope for improving infrastructures and human capital for which 
public capital (considered quite widely and loosely) should be of great help. The final target 
would be, of course, to boost potential and actual economic growth22. Promoting economic 
growth via public investment stems from two channels. First, public investment provides 
public goods like transport infrastructures which benefit users and directly or indirectly 
improve total factor productivity. Second, public investment also raises overall welfare when 
it participates in the protection of environment or enhance the fairness in resource 
distribution.  
Another advantage in adopting a fiscal rule which would exclude public capital formation 
from the deficit target would be to narrow the gap in budget practices in the euro area with 
that in the UK. This may produce further incentives for the UK to join the euro area in a not-
too-far future. Indeed, the UK budget incorporates a medium-run target for the net-of-public 
investment deficit, where the medium-run corresponds to a cycle. Over this cycle, this deficit 
should be balanced. The ensuing “golden rule” is associated with a “sustainable investment 
rule” (HM Treasury, 2002) 23 in order to prevent any overstatement for public investment and 
to limit net public debt below 40% of GDP.  
The supposedly “unsustainable” feature of a “golden rule” is the major drawback 
discussed by its opponents. It is at least part of the reason for adopting a “sustainable 
investment rule” in the UK.  
Hence, as discussed in EC (2003, part III), a “golden rule of public finance” in the EU 
would stop the reduction in public debts. Part of the rationale for slowing down public debt to 
GDP ratios in the euro area has been related to monetary policy. High public debts are seen as 
a threat to price stability and to the independence of the ECB. Though the latter cannot 
“monetize” public debts, on statutory grounds, high debts might increase default risk which, if 
                                                 
22 Some contributions to the debate on “productive public capital” are Aschauer (1989), Bleaney et al. 
(2001) and Knight et al. (1999). They all find a significant and positive impact of public investment or public 
capital on the output, but in the case of Bleaney et al. only insofar as distorsive taxes do not finance 
expenditures. 
23 See also Buiter (2001). 
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it materialized, would necessitate that monetary policy be accommodative or that the ECB be 
the lender of last resort. Both actions might prove inflationary.  
However, the argument is biased against public debt as it neglects the demand side of the 
market for public bonds. Two important determinants of the demand for bonds are liquidity 
and a low risk. Public bonds incorporate both. And the relevance of these two determinants 
would also explain why, when public debt decreases – as was the case in the USA at the end 
of the nineties – the demand for public bonds switches to bonds issued by government-
sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae fund or Freddy Mac fund in the USA, or Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau in Germany. The optimal ratio of net public debt to GDP is thus sizably 
different from zero; it may also be different in some EU countries from the debt ceiling in the 
Maastricht treaty, or from 40% of GDP in the UK. It should also be kept in mind that high 
public debt levels in Belgium have neither prevented the Belgian economy from reaching low 
inflation rate levels nor the Franc belge from being fixed vis-à-vis the Deutschemark during 
the EMS period. Limiting supply of public debt should not be left unlinked to the demand 
side. 
Yet, the consequences of adopting a “golden rule of public finance” on public debt levels 
in the EU need an assessment. In fact, as shown in the appendix, adopting a rule based on the 
cyclically-adjusted net-of-public-investment deficit (Fitoussi and Creel, 2002, Le Cacheux, 
2002) without any “sustainable investment rule”, would endogenously limit public 
investment’s growth. To understand the underlying mechanism, a two-step analysis is needed. 
First, financing public investment by borrowing (obviously) incurs interest payments. Second, 
these payments hinder structural expenditures other than public investment (equation (1) in 
the appendix). As the reduction in these structural ‘non-public-investment’ expenditures will 
always face a lower bound, interest payments’ growth will therefore face a ceiling, hence also 
public borrowing’s and public investment’s growth.  
This is an argument against those who consider that adopting a “golden rule” would 
provoke a steep and unsustainable increase in public borrowing. In the euro area, it would 
take the public debt to GDP ratio more than a hundred years to rise up to 104% if the ratio of 
public investment to GDP were permanently increased by a one-percent point (see the 
appendix). Though it may be considered a “steep” – though slow – increase, it would not be 
unsustainable insofar as public investment would enhance potential growth, and insofar as 
higher debt is balanced by a higher demand for public bonds. This could happen either 
through a higher nominal yield, in parallel to higher economic growth rates, or through higher 
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demand for liquid-assets. The latter could result, for instance, from the generalisation of fully-
funded pension systems in the euro area. 
The endogenous limit to public investment which is incorporated in the rule based upon 
the cyclically-adjusted net-of-public-investment deficit, is also an answer to Buti et al. (2003) 
when they state that “the possibility of borrowing without strict limits in order to finance 
investments can lower the attention paid when evaluating the costs and benefits of each 
project.” (p.18). As the growth in public investment is limited by the necessity to pay interests 
on public debt, it is in the interest of government to implement investments whose cost/ 
benefits ratio is the lowest. 
Besides public debt’s growth or the cost/benefits analysis, other criticisms to the adoption 
of a “golden rule” in the euro area are worth mentioning. Balassone and Franco (2000) 
consider that the “golden rule”, as it is promoting public investment, will result in a bias in 
favour of physical assets, at the expense of health and education expenditures. Hence, the 
definition of “public investment” in national account statistics includes transactions that lead 
to changes in the stock of physical capital (like the construction of infrastructures or the 
purchase of computer hardware), but excludes large amounts of expenditures related to the 
accumulation of human capital, like training or R&D.  
On this topic, I fully agree with Le Cacheux (2002) or Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) 
that a broader assessment of “public investment” should be promoted, but only insofar as 
changes in the “accounting rules” are made possible, say, every 5 years – a delay known ex 
ante – in order to prevent an opportunistic behaviour by the governments. Blanchard and 
Giavazzi, for instance, argue that, “rules that allow net public investment to be financed by 
borrowing need to be complemented by rules that define what can be counted as public 
investment – something like ISA accounting rules. This is a task for the Statistical office of 
the EU. Such rules will have to deal with the incentive to re-define current spending as public 
investment, and this may not be easy. But this difficulty should not be an argument for 
justifying rules that may result in worthwhile projects not being undertaken because of cash 
constraints.” (p.9). And, quoting Le Cacheux (2002): “more empirical work on the links 
between public expenditures – and indeed fiscal policies in general, including tax policies—
and potential growth (should be undertaken). And it should be stressed that public accounting 
practices and rules, in particular the distinction between current and investment expenditures, 
are essentially conventional, just as private accounting rules. Hence, they may be reconsidered 
and redefined if a good case can be made that new accounting rules make more economic 
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sense” (p.10). The question of the definition of public investment expenditures is mentioned 
again in the conclusion. 
Another criticism to the “golden rule” is that it promotes public capital, though it is 
overall capital, from the public and private sectors, that should be promoted. To counter this 
argument, which can also be found in Balassone and Franco (2000)24, one can state that there 
are sectors or regions in which the existence of public capital has substantial positive 
externalities on activity and on private investment. Two channels of transmission of the 
impact of public infrastructures on growth are generally distinguished: first, through the 
production capacities which may show complementarities between public and private 
investment, and thus improve total factor productivity25. Second, the output of private firms 
depends not only on how much labour and private capital they employ, but also on the quality 
of the environment in which they operate. Many facets of this environment, such as the legal 
framework, the quality of the transport network and, to some extent, the quality of 
telecommunications are at least partly supplied by governments, hence complementarities 
between public and private capital expenditures.  
An assessment via the Kopits and Symansky’s taxonomy 
Let me briefly summarize how the rule which is here at stake could be formulated. 
Within the euro area, the combination of a cyclical adjustment with taking public investment 
out of the deficit ceiling would lead to adopting a fiscal rule that would have a zero ceiling on 
the ratio to GDP of the cyclically-adjusted, net-of-public-investment deficit. This can be 
viewed as a “modified golden rule”, though this remains in line with Robinson’s (1998) 
definition of the “golden rule”26. In fact, this is a “modified rule” as regards the rule 
advocated, for instance, by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003): they favour a ceiling on the total 
budget net of public investment. This leaves open the question of fiscal automatic stabilizers. 
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi’s proposal, provided governments have recovered some 
                                                 
24 OLS estimates of the direct effect of public investment on private investment have been performed by 
the EC (2003, table III.2) and are inconclusive, except for Spain and Portugal (for which positive “crowding-in” 
effects are found) and the UK (for which a negative “crowding out” effect is found). In this latter country, 
according to the EC, the negative relationship between public and private investment might result from a 
coincidence: the privatisation process would have decreased public investment while increasing “to a certain 
extent” investment in the private sector.  
25 This channel was at the core of Aschauer (1989)’s paper. He showed that the slowdown in productivity 
growth in the US private sector during the seventies and eighties was the consequence of a shortage of 
investment in public infrastructure. 
26 “It is commonplace (…) for the golden rule to be viewed as requiring structurally balanced accrual 
budgets” (Robinson, 1998, p.449). 
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margins for manoeuvre, they would face a trade-off between implementing a contra-cyclical 
policy and increasing public investment. The bias against public investment during economic 
slowdown would persist. Moreover, the “modified rule” would be more stringent than the rule 
advocated by Buiter et al. (1993), though their rule is assumed to be consistent with the 
“golden rule”, provided that optimal public investment is equal to 3% of GDP in each EU 
country. Adopting a primary cyclically-adjusted deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP would be 
unsustainable, as there would be no intrinsic forces stopping interest payments and public 
debts, expressed in terms of GDP, from growing.  
Now, basing upon the properties defined by Kopits and Symansky (1998), I can assess 
the performance of the “modified golden rule” (table 4). First, it is worth mentioning that, as 
this rule has not been adopted yet, evaluation of properties 1, 2 and 6 is almost impossible. 
Outcomes for these three properties would (will?) depend on politicians’ willingness to 
improve the fiscal institutional framework within the EU. If ever they chose to adopt the 
“modified golden rule”, much effort should be undertaken to improve these three 
characteristics in comparison with the current SGP.  
Second, simplicity could be the Achilles’ heel of the reform proposal. Assessing fiscal 
stance in terms of a cyclically-adjusted deficit is quite difficult but removing public 
investment adds to the complexity of the indicator. However, it would be the task of European 
governments to make some pedagogy on this target. Ex ante transparency on the methodology 
used to compute cyclically-influenced components of tax revenues and public expenditures, 
and on the precise scope for “public investment” would help to improve the simplicity of the 
new indicator. Of course, as far as symbolic figures are concerned, replacing “3 percent” by 
“zero percent” is simple and should not make the “modified golden rule” deserve a low mark 
for its “simplicity feature”. However, as improved transparency remains uncertain concerning 
the public understanding of what is economically meant by a “modified golden rule”, a “fair 
value” is attributed to simplicity.  
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Table 4. The modified golden rule against ideal rules standards 
Ideal fiscal rule  The modified golden rule 
1. Well-defined ? 
2. Transparent ? 
3. Simple +(+) 
4. Flexible +++ 
5. Adequate relative to goal +++ 
6. Enforceable ? 
7. Consistent +++ 
8. Efficient +++ 
Legend: +++ very good, ++ good, + fair, ? depends on what the politicians will do  
 
Third, values for the remaining characteristics of the rule are given a “very good” mark. 
As the rule would let automatic stabilisers play fully and would also let governments gain 
freedom in the choice and size of public investments, the rule would permit to counter shocks 
and to improve potential output. Flexibility in the sense of Kopits and Symansky cannot be 
higher. 
Adequacy of the rule to the final goal (sound public finance) also deserves a top-level 
mark. Public finances, though overall deficits and debts would grow if countries used new 
margins for manoeuvre to improve productive capital expenditures, would be partly self-
financed and would not be unsustainable in the long run. Higher potential growth would 
spread to economic growth and would thus stabilise the deficit to GDP and debt to GDP 
ratios. Of course, if it is assumed that the final goal of the new fiscal policy framework is 
economic growth, its advantages are obvious. Even if the goal were price stability, the 
“modified golden rule” would still be adequate: discretionary policy, whose inflationary 
consequences could not be disregarded on a priori grounds, would be fettered by the necessity 
to finance interest charges. By definition, automatic stabilisers are not inflationary as they 
help to match aggregate demand to aggregate supply. Public investment is also supposed to 
have no consequences on the inflation rate, at least in the mid and long run, because it is 
meant to improve potential growth.  
Since the “modified golden rule” should boost potential growth and should not jeopardise 
price stability, consistency with monetary policy in the euro area and in the EU should 
perform well. The “new” fiscal framework would also give some leeway to governments as 
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regards their management of the cyclically-adjusted deficit. They could at the same time 
implement a tax reform and a public investment program, insofar as they are able to reduce 
some extra-expenditures or insofar as they expect larger economic growth from both 
measures. Governments could also prefer to reform (and reduce) tax rates and not to enhance 
public investment; doing this, they would save some extra-interest charges in order to cope 
with short-run reductions in tax receipts. 
Under the current SGP, recall that governments have been unable to reduce tax rates 
substantially because they had to fulfil the overall deficit target. Switching to a mere 
cyclically-adjusted deficit is still conditional on countries with a deficit to reduce it by 0.5% 
of GDP each year (Solbes, 2002, later endorsed by the Commission and Ecofin, expect the 
French Minister of Finance); it will still postpone governments’ ability to implement tax 
reforms. 
Hence, except for some features whose evaluation is obviously uncertain, the “modified 
golden rule” seems close to the ideal standard first developed by Kopits and Symansky. 
Targeting a cyclically-adjusted net-of-public-investment balance seems a “very good” policy. 
Conclusion 
As a conclusion, a comparison of the “ideal-ness” of various fiscal rules may be 
welcome. In table 5 below, two fiscal rules are evaluated. The marks for each feature of an 
ideal rule have been given an equivalent number from zero (“bad value”) to three (“very good 
value”). I only report the average mark. For each fiscal rule, two evaluations are given. As far 
as the current SGP is concerned, I oppose Buti et al. (2003)’s average mark (coming from the 
values reported in table 2) with mine (table 3). It is obvious from the discussion developed in 
section 2 that we value the SGP very differently. Now concerning the “modified golden rule”, 
the first average assessment is based on the five features for which I have given a (subjective) 
value. Of course, if uncertainty regarding definition, transparency and enforceability of the 
“modified golden rule” is being disregarded, this rule is the most likely to cope with ideal 
rules standards. Averaging among the best performing features of a rule however is unfair, in 
comparison with the SGP, so that I present a second assessment for the “modified golden 
rule”. To achieve it, I have considered that the features for which it is almost impossible to 
give a definite mark should be given the same values as those I have attributed to the SGP. 
The logic here is the following: I bet politicians will not do worse than what they did under 
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the SGP if they decide to reform it; I also assume that they will not do better. In first 
approximation, this may seem a fairly reasonable assumption! Under this condition, the mark 
attributed to the “modified golden rule” is exactly the same as that attributed by Buti et al. 
(2003) to the current SGP.  
 
Table 5. General evaluation of different fiscal rules 
Fiscal rules Average mark
SGP  
(according to Buti et al., 2003)  
++ 
SGP  
(according to the author) 
+ 
The modified golden rule +++ 
The modified golden rule (bis) ++ 
Legend: +++ very good, ++ good, + fair. 
 
Does it mean that the differences between the two fiscal frameworks are not so important 
as to push governments to adopt the latter? The answer is: no. Though Buti et al. (2003) 
propose an internal adjustment to the Pact, which would make them value it better, I think the 
SGP is flawed – at best “fair” – and that their reform proposal will not change dramatically 
the European fiscal framework, though it is needed. Inversely, concerning the “modified 
golden rule”, what the value attributed to this rule in the worst scenario shows is that, insofar 
as it is implemented, politicians and policymakers must work hand in hand to make it a 
transparent, well-defined and enforceable framework. Other properties of an “ideal fiscal 
rule” are already self-enforcing in the case of the “modified golden rule”. Provided politicians 
and policymakers cooperate, despite the difficulties, the EU will gain lower economic 
fluctuations (via automatic stabilisers) and higher growth (via public investment). This is 
worth trying it. 
The direct consequence of the “modified golden rule” proposal is that more empirical 
work is needed on the links between public investment at large, including health and 
education sectors, and economic growth or total factor productivity. Turning to a 
measurement of efficiency that is based upon a production frontier (via technical efficiency or 
the data envelopment analysis, Charnes et al., 1978) would be a programming option. Basing 
upon the results of these necessary future studies, governments would be able to propose a 
precise and exhaustive classification of “productive public expenditures” which should be 
removed from the new fiscal rule. Such a classification is left to future research. 
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Appendix 
 
The dynamics of public debt which is incorporated in the “modified golden rule for 
public finance” discussed above stems from some definitions and rules: first, public deficit 
Deft (subscript t for time) splits into a cyclical (Defc,t) and a cyclically-adjusted (Defs,t) 
component, where the former has an elasticity of 0.5 towards the output gap (OGt)27,  
, ,
, 0.5* * .
t c t s t
c t t t
Def Def Def
Def OG GDP
= +
= −  
Two components are structural (cyclically-adjusted): interest payments (I) and the 
primary structural deficit (PSD); the latter can be split into public investment (PI) and a 
residual, discretionary and autonomous deficit (DAD): 
,
.
s t t t
t t t
Def I PSD
PSD PI DAD
= +
= +  
Public debt B varies according to: 
1 .t t tB B Def−= +  
The “modified golden rule of public finance” gives: 
, 0.s t tDef PI− =  
Hence, the cyclically-adjusted deficit reduces to public investment. Other consequences 
are also the following: 
(1): ,t tDAD I= −  which means that higher interest payments must be compensated with a 
lower discretionary and autonomous deficit; there is thus clearly a upper limit to interest 
payments as the discretionary and autonomous surplus might also face an upper bound; and 
(2): 
1
0.5* *
0.5* * .
t t t t
t t t t
Def PI OG GDP
B B PI OG GDP−
= −
= + −  
Following expressions in (2), the dynamics of the public debt to GDP ratio bt runs 
according to: 
                                                 
27 The term 0.5 represents the budget sensitivity to the output gap of the public deficit for the EU 11 
countries (reported in Fischer J. and G. Guidice (2001)). GDP is the gross domestic product. 
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1
1 * 0.5* .t tt t t
t t
GDP PIb b OG
GDP GDP
−
−= + −  
The stability of the public debt to GDP ratio requires that: 
1 0.5* , /(1 ),tt t
t
PIb OG where y y y
y GDP
• • = − = +  
 and y
•
 is the GDP growth rate. 
A numerical application at the steady state (OG=0), with a ratio of public investment to 
GDP of 3.5% (a one-percent point higher than in the Euro area) and economic (potential) 
growth equal to 3.5%, all expressed in yearly terms, show that the increase in the ratio would 
provoke an increase of the public debt to GDP ratio up to 103.5%28. Simulating this 
permanent 1 percentage point increase in the ratio of public investment to GDP, with effective 
growth converging towards its potential after 4 years and with the long term interest rate 
converging towards economic potential growth at the same pace, would take more than a 
hundred years for the debt to GDP ratio to reach 103%, all else equal (see graph below, details 
available from the author upon request)29.  
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28 The long term public debt to GDP ratio is sensitive to potential growth. Be it equal to 3% or 4%, and the 
public debt to GDP ratio would equal 120% or 91% respectively. 
29 The initial public debt to GDP ratio (in 2002) is taken from Eurostat and embraces the euro area. 
